Evidencia internacional sobre la influencia de los grandes accionistas en el riesgo corporativo

  1. Díez Esteban, José María
  2. García Gómez, Conrado Diego
  3. López Iturriaga, Félix Javier
Revista:
Revista española de financiación y contabilidad

ISSN: 0210-2412

Año de publicación: 2013

Número: 160

Páginas: 487-512

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1080/02102412.2013.11102927 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR

Otras publicaciones en: Revista española de financiación y contabilidad

Resumen

This paper analyzes the relationship between ownership structure (shareholders' stake and identity) and corporate risk taking for a sample of companies from 21 OECD countries for the period 2001-2008. Our main contribution is considering simultaneously the effect of growth opportunities and the institutional environment. Our results suggest that growth opportunities create incentives to the largest shareholder to take (avoid) risk when the fi rm has (does not have) growth opportunities. We also fi nd a trend to the alignment of interests between the largest shareholder and the other large shareholders, so that the latter support the risk policy of the former. Finally, the identity of the largest shareholder is relevant, being family fi rms the least prone to excessive corporate risk exposure

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