Buena administración y procedimientos de selección de contratistasanálisis de mecanismos jurídicos e informativos para alcanzar la eficiencia en las licitaciones públicas

Resumen

The thesis attempts to demonstrate that authorities and public bodies acting in the relevant market for public commissions are linked to performance criteria similar to those that govern private economic agents. However, the levels of efficiency is not achieved in practice so we try to find an explanation for the inefficiency of government procurement. In this way we analyze the duty of administration buna concluding that the same efficient behavior prescribed by the authorities which led to the contractor selection procedures resulted in changing the focus of their analysis, through to design those as a mechanism for information exchange. This way of analyzing the administrative procedures led us to conclude that two of the main causes of administrations and public bodies are not as efficient as the duty of good administration prescribed, we find that the flow of information exchanged in the procedures selection of contractors, are characterized by asymmetrical relationships between individuals and government. Additionally, we conclude that the structure of the Act on public sector contracts, it allowed collusive equilibria which could also be an explanation of why authorities and public bodies do not reach the efficiency mandates imposed by the duty of good administration.