Pactos parasociales y retribución de los accionistas en las grandes empresas españolas¿el efecto Mateo?

  1. López Iturriaga, Félix Javier
  2. Santana Martín, Domingo Javier
Zeitschrift:
AECA: Revista de la Asociación Española de Contabilidad y Administración de Empresas

ISSN: 1577-2403

Datum der Publikation: 2014

Nummer: 106

Seiten: 21-23

Art: Artikel

Andere Publikationen in: AECA: Revista de la Asociación Española de Contabilidad y Administración de Empresas

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