Boards of directors and firm performancethe effect of multiple directorships

  1. López Iturriaga, Félix Javier
  2. Morrós Rodríguez, Ignacio
Revista:
Revista española de financiación y contabilidad

ISSN: 0210-2412

Año de publicación: 2014

Número: 162

Páginas: 177-192

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1080/02102412.2014.913909 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR

Otras publicaciones en: Revista española de financiación y contabilidad

Información de financiación

The authors acknowledge the financial support of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (project ECO2011-29144-C03-01).

Financiadores

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