El concepto de especie y los cambios teóricos en biología

  1. Folguera, Guillermo 1
  2. Marcos, Alfredo 2
  1. 1 CONICET / Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina.
  2. 2 Departamento de Filosofía, Universidad de Valladolid, Valladolid, España.
Revista:
Ludus vitalis: revista de filosofía de las ciencias de la vida = journal of philosophy of life sciences = revue de philosophie des sciences de la vie

ISSN: 1133-5165

Año de publicación: 2013

Volumen: 21

Número: 39

Páginas: 1-25

Tipo: Artículo

Otras publicaciones en: Ludus vitalis: revista de filosofía de las ciencias de la vida = journal of philosophy of life sciences = revue de philosophie des sciences de la vie

Resumen

The concept of species and the technical changes in biologyThe meaning of scientific concepts depends on their theoretical framework, so a theoretical change could induce an alteration in the meaning of some concepts. This idea is usually attributed to Kuhn and we will apply it to the species concept. In particular, we focus here on the link between the historical and recent changes in theoretical biology and the transformation of the concept of species. These changes have effects not only on the epistemological and ontological fields, but on some ethical debates. In this study, we will analyze the historical modifications occurred till the consolidation of evolutionary biology in the nineteenth century, as well as the theoretical changes occurred within the biological Synthesis during recent years. We will identify the correspondent changes on the species concept, both in operational and ontological terms. Finally, we will raise some ethical issues related to the meaning we give to species and, therefore, to the theoretical framework in which we place ourselves.

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