Ciclo de vida de un concepto en el marco de la cognición ad hoc

  1. José V. Hernández-Conde
Revista:
Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science

ISSN: 0495-4548

Año de publicación: 2017

Volumen: 32

Número: 3

Páginas: 271-292

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1387/THEORIA.16216 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science

Resumen

Recientemente Casasanto y Lupyan (2015) han sostenido que no hay conceptos independientes del contexto: todos los conceptos serían construidos ad hoc en el momento de su instanciación. El presente artículo muestra que el marco de la cognición ad hoc puede caracterizarse mediante una teoría de similaridad conceptual, y distingue dos nociones de concepto —asociadas a diferentes fases de su ciclo de vida (almacenamiento e instanciación)—. Esta propuesta reúne virtudes de enfoques opuestos: (a) invariantista: la estabilidad del concepto almacenado permite acumular nueva información; (b) contextualista: la dependencia contextual del concepto instanciado explica nuestra capacidad de adaptación.

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet