Independent versus non-independent outside directors in European companieswho has a say on CEO compensation?

  1. Pablo de Andrés 1
  2. Laura Arranz-Aperte 12
  3. Juan Antonio Rodríguez-Sanz 3
  1. 1 Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
    info

    Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

    Madrid, España

    ROR https://ror.org/01cby8j38

  2. 2 Hanken School of Economics
    info

    Hanken School of Economics

    Helsinki, Finlandia

    ROR https://ror.org/026086s92

  3. 3 Universidad de Valladolid
    info

    Universidad de Valladolid

    Valladolid, España

    ROR https://ror.org/01fvbaw18

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Revista:
Business Research Quarterly

ISSN: 2340-9444,  2340-9436

Año de publicación: 2017

Volumen: 20

Número: 2

Páginas: 79-95

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1016/J.BRQ.2017.02.001 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Business Research Quarterly

Resumen

Nuestro estudio revela cómo dos dimensiones separadas de la composición de la junta (la proporción de directores independientes y de directores no independientes) influyen en la compensación de los directores ejecutivos en las empresas de Europa occidental. Controlando la determinación simultánea de la estructura salarial de los CEO y el diseño de la junta, encontramos que las empresas con una mayor proporción de personas externas no independientes en sus juntas pagan menos compensación directa (salario + bonificación) y menos compensación vinculada a la equidad a sus CEO. Por el contrario, los directores ejecutivos que trabajan para empresas con consejos más independientes reciben más remuneración basada en acciones. Cuando controlamos por el hecho de que las acciones vinculadas no se otorgan sistemáticamente en Europa, encontramos que las empresas con más directores independientes en el consejo tienden a otorgar compensaciones vinculadas a las acciones con más frecuencia que las empresas con más directores externos no independientes.

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Información de financiación

Sandra Sizer and Alisa Larson for editorial assistance. Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (grants ECO2012-32554 and ECO2014-56102-P) and from the Santander Financial Institute (APIE Num. 2/2015-2017) are gratefully acknowledged

Financiadores

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