Corporate governance in Latin American firmscontestability of control and firm value

  1. Mauricio Jar 1
  2. Félix López-Iturriaga 2
  3. Pablo San-Martín 3
  4. Paola Saona
  1. 1 Universidad de Chile
    info

    Universidad de Chile

    Santiago de Chile, Chile

    ROR https://ror.org/047gc3g35

  2. 2 Universidad de Valladolid
    info

    Universidad de Valladolid

    Valladolid, España

    ROR https://ror.org/01fvbaw18

  3. 3 Universidad Católica de la Santísima Concepción, Chile
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Revista:
Business Research Quarterly

ISSN: 2340-9444,  2340-9436

Año de publicación: 2019

Volumen: 22

Número: 4

Páginas: 257-274

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1016/J.BRQ.2018.10.005 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Business Research Quarterly

Resumen

Utilizando una muestra de 595 empresas que figuran en los mercados de capitales de Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, México y Perú para el período de 2000 a 2015, confirmamos la literatura previa, mostrando que cuando la distribución de energía entre varios accionistas grandes ( impugnabilidad ) aumenta , se mejora el desempeño financiero de las empresas. Más interesante aún, encontramos que estas relaciones son aún más significativas en las empresas familiares, enfatizando la relevancia de disputar el control en este tipo de empresas. Además, la contestabilidadtiene una mayor influencia en las empresas familiares que tienen la propiedad más concentrada. También encontramos que el marco legal atenúa el impacto del equilibrio de propiedad. Aquí, impugnar el control actúa como un mecanismo de gobierno corporativo interno que brinda una alternativa al marco legal externo. Tomados en conjunto, nuestros resultados significan que en entornos institucionales caracterizados por una débil protección de los inversores y posibles conflictos de interés entre los accionistas, la supervisión de múltiples accionistas grandes no relacionados (concentración equilibrada de la propiedad) se convierte en un importante mecanismo de gobernanza.

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Información de financiación

We also thank the support of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (grant ECO2017-84864-P)

Financiadores

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