La estructura contractual de la gran empresa españolaFactores determinantes del apalancamiento contractual

Abstract

During the last twenty years, positive agency theory has been focused on the study of a broad range of phenomena associated with the financial contracts of the firm. More recently, however, new lines of research within the agency theory have switched their attention to the joint analysis of both the explicit and implicit cooperation relationships existing within the firm. This broader perspective does not restrict itself to financial relationships, but instead it considers all kinds of cooperative relationships that determine the contractual structure of the firm. Following these proposals, this paper presents a characterization of the Spanish firm in terms of its contractual structure. We identify a number of variables that were previously introduced in the analysis: fixed, variable and mixed payoff contracts; internal and external contracts; contractual leverage; ownership concentration; nature of the main sharebolder etc. For this purpose, we first analyze the contractual structure of a sample of one hundred and thirty two firms, which are representative of the large, non financial, Spanish corporate firm. We then proceed to try to characterize the Spanish corporate firm and explain the main determinants of their contractual leverage