La regla del comprador indirecto en la aplicación privada del derecho de la competencia. Análisis jurídico y económico

Referencias bibliográficas

• Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law. An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, Vol. II, Wolter Kluwer, New York, 2014, p. 40;
• Herbert Hovenkamp, «Quantification of harm in private antitrust actions in the United States», 2011, p. 5, publicación online disponible en http://papers.ssrn. com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1758751.
• Herbert Hovenkamp, «Quantification of Harm in Private Antitrust Actions in the United Sta-tes», 1 University of Iowa Legal Studies, 2011, p. 9.
• Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its Practice, 5th. ed., Thomson/West, St. Paul, 2015, p. 657.
• Robert Lande, «Five Myths About Antitrust Damages», University of San Francisco Law Review, Vol. 40, 2006, p. 664
• Robert Lande, «Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Vio¬lations», 50 University of Chicago Law Review, 1983, pp. 652 y ss.
• William Holmes, Melissa Mangiaracina, Antitrust Law Handbook, Thomson Reu¬ters, Eagan, 2013, pp. 925-927.
• Daniel Crane, «Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement», Working Paper Nº. 09-021, 2009, p. 20, disponible online en http://papers.ssrn. com/.
• Luis Antonio Velasco San Pedro, Carmen Herrero Suárez, «La Passing-on Defence: ¿Un falso Dilema?», en AA.VV., La aplicación privada del Derecho de la competencia, Lex Nova, Valladolid, 2011, pp. 593 y ss.
• Robert Harris, Lawrence Sullivan, «Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis», University of Pennsylvania Law Review nº. 1, 1979, pp. 269-271,
• William Landes, Richard Posner, «The Economics of Passing On: A Reply to Harris and Sullivan», 128 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1980, pp. 1274-1279.
• Luigi Prosperetti, «Estimating damages to competitors from exclusionary practices in Europe: a review of the main issues in the light of national Courts’experience», en AA.VV., Competition Law and Intelectual Property: A European Perspective, Wolters Kluwer, Netherlands, 2012; p. 250
• Jeffrey Wooldridge, Introduction to Econometrics, Cengage Learning, Hampshire, 2013, pp. 419-420.
• Enrique Moral-Benito, «Model Averaging in Economics: An Overview»; Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 29, 2015, p. 46,
• Albert FOER, Randy Stutz, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the United States: A Handbook, Edward Elgar, Massachusetts, 2012, p. 315,
• Jonathan Baker, «Private Information and the Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Damage Remedies», en 4 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 1988, pp. 385-400.
• Edward Snyder, «Efficient Assignment of Rights to Sue for Antitrust Damages», 28 Journal of Law & Economics, 1986, pp. 469-482.
• Maarten Schinkel, Jan Tuinstra, Jakob Rüggeberg, «Illinois Wall: How Barring Indirect Purchaser Suits Facilitates Collusion», RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 39, nº. 3, 2008, p. 686
• Margaret Levenstein, Valerie Suslow, «What determines Cartel Success?», 44 Journal of Economic Literature, 2006, pp. 57-58.
• William Kolasky, «Coordinated Effects in Merger Review: From Dead Frenchmen to Beautiful Minds and Mavericks», 2002, p. 20
• John Lapotka, William Page, «Indirect Purchaser Suits and the Consumer Interest», Antitrust Bulletin, vol. 48, 2009, op. cit., p. 563.
• Firat Cengiz, «Passing-on Defence and Indirect Purchaser Standing in Actions for Damages against the Violations of Competition Law: What Can the EC learn from the US?», CCP, Norwich, 2008, p. 32, disponible online en http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1038521, y Centre for European Policy Studies, Making antitrust damages actions more effective in the EU: welfare impact and potential scenarios – Final Report, DG COMP/2006/ A3/012, Bruxelas, 2007, p. 461, disponible online en http://ec.europa.eu/.
• Aba: Indirect Purchaser Litigation Handbook, ABA Publishing, Illinois, 2007, pp. 141-142.
• ABA, Proving Antitrust Damages. Legal and Economic Issues, Vol. I, 2nd. ed., ABA Publishing, Illinois, 2010, p. 225.
• Martin Hellwig, «Private Damage Claims and the Passing-on Defence in Horizontal Price-Fixing Cases: An Economist’s Perspective», en Jurgen Basedow, Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, Kluwer Law International, Netherlands, 2007, p. 128.
• William Landes, Richard Posner, «Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule Should od Illinois Brick», 46 University of Chicago Law Review, 1979, p. 602.
• Leonardo Basso, Thomas Ross, «Measuring the True Harm from Price-fixing to Both Direct and Indirect Purchasers», 2008, publicación online disponible en http://strategy.sauder.ubc.ca/ross/Measuringthe True Harmfrom PriceFixing.pdf.
• Frank Verboven, Theon van Dick, «Quantification of damages», en ABA Publications in Anti-trust, 2006, disponible online en https://feb.kuleuven. be/.
• Elena Cristina Tudor, «La admisión de la defensa passing-on en el cártel del azúcar: ensayo crítico sobre la Sentencia de la A.P. de Madrid, Seccion nº. 8, asunto 737/07», en RCD, nº 11, 2012, pp. 277-291.
• Ronald Cotterill, Leonard Egan, William Buckhold, «Beyond Illinois Brick: The Law and Eco-nomics of Cost-Pass-Through in the ADM Price-Fixing Case», 18 Review of Industrial Organization, 2001, p. 45.
• Francisco Cantos, Enrique Carrera, Pablo Gonzalo, «La aplicación privada del Derecho de la Competencia en España y en el Derecho comparado: propuesta de Directiva de daños y algunas cuestiones jurídicas que suscita», Gaceta jurídica de la Unión Europea y de la Competencia, nº 36, La Ley, 2013, p. 14,
• Jesús Alfaro Águila-Real, «Contra la armonización positiva: la Propuesta de la Comisión para reforzar el private enforcement del Derecho de la Competencia», Indret 3/2009, p. 5.
• William Page, «The Limits of State Purchasers Suits: Class Certification in the Shadow of Illinois Brick», 67 Antitrust Law Journal, nº 1, 1999, pp. 1-35.