¿Convención o necesidad? Berkeley y Kantdos visiones sobre las leyes de la mecánica newtoniana

Abstract

Newton's laws, long taken as the supreme principles that explained all phenomena of a mechanical nature, constitute a paradigmatic case of laws of nature. In this doctoral thesis, we investigate the positions of two philosophers, George Berkeley and Immanuel Kant, who reflected on Newton's physics, and compare their opposing interpretations of this and its laws. The first, from an empiricist and conventionalist position, reduced Newtonian science to mere instrumental knowledge, conceiving its laws as mathematical hypotheses useful for calculation. The second, aware of the limitations of empiricism, took Newtonian science as proof of the existence of a universal and necessary knowledge whose principles are synthetic a priori, and tried to base Newton's laws on the a priori principles of transcendental understanding. In each author, we explore their conception of the laws of nature and the laws of Newtonian mechanics in relation to related concepts such as explanation, causality, necessity, universality, and experience. We also highlight the importance of the conception of space and motion in relation to Newton's laws. In short, we contrast these dissenting positions of Berkeley and Kant, explore their roots, frame them in the philosophical systems of their authors, and look for points of convergence as well.