Delegación y sistemas de incentivos en las entidades sin fines de lucroel caso de las ONGD españolas

  1. Martín Pérez, Víctor Manuel
  2. Martín Cruz, Natalia
  3. Hernangómez Barahona, Juan José
Revista:
Revista europea de dirección y economía de la empresa

ISSN: 1019-6838

Año de publicación: 2010

Volumen: 19

Número: 4

Páginas: 171-190

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Revista europea de dirección y economía de la empresa

Resumen

El funcionamiento interno de las organizaciones ha sido siempre un tema considerado de interés, pero muy poco tratado en la investigación. En este trabajo nos centramos en las organizaciones no gubernamentales para el desarrollo (ONGD), organizaciones que muestran una preocupación creciente por conseguir un adecuado diseño organizativo para su entidad. El objetivo del presente trabajo es valorar el equilibrio de dos decisiones clave en el diseño organizativo: la delegación de autoridad a los empleados y el establecimiento de sistemas de incentivos para garantizar que esos empleados no llevan a cabo una utilización interesada de su discrecionalidad. Se plantea un modelo simultáneo para estas dos decisiones, considerando la delegación y los sistemas de incentivos como variables endógenas. Los resultados del análisis empírico, llevado a cabo en las más importantes ONGD españolas durante el año 2003, evidencia que las decisiones sobre delegación de derechos de decisión y sistemas de incentivos son interdependientes.

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