Institutional directors and board compensationspanish evidence

  1. López Iturriaga, Félix Javier
  2. García Meca, Emma 1
  3. Tejerina Gaite, Fernando
  1. 1 Universidad Politécnica de Cartagena
    info

    Universidad Politécnica de Cartagena

    Cartagena, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02k5kx966

Revista:
Business Research Quarterly

ISSN: 2340-9444,  2340-9436

Año de publicación: 2015

Volumen: 18

Número: 3

Páginas: 161-173

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1016/J.BRQ.2014.07.003 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Business Research Quarterly

Resumen

Abordamos la influencia de los directores que representan a los inversionistas institucionales en tres aspectos de las políticas de compensación del directorio: nivel de compensación, composición y sensibilidad al desempeño. Distinguimos a los directores sensibles a la presión (es decir, con vínculos comerciales) de los directores resistentes a la presión (es decir, sin vínculos comerciales). Nuestros resultados muestran que los directores resistentes a la presión disminuyen la remuneración total del directorio y su proporción fija, mientras que aumentan la proporción variable de la remuneración total y la sensibilidad al pago por desempeño. Por el contrario, los directores sensibles a la presión ofrecen los resultados opuestos. Estos hallazgos son consistentes con la opinión de que los inversores institucionales no son un grupo homogéneo y que los directores resistentes a la presión cumplen una función de seguimiento más exhaustiva.

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