Controversies on the Empirical Significance of Auxiliary Assumptions

  1. Caamaño Alegre, María 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Valladolid
    info

    Universidad de Valladolid

    Valladolid, España

    ROR https://ror.org/01fvbaw18

Revista:
Philosophia: anuario de Filosofía

ISSN: 0328-9672,  2313-9528

Año de publicación: 2020

Volumen: 80

Número: 1

Páginas: 9-39

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Philosophia: anuario de Filosofía

Resumen

En cualquier ámbito científico, las leyes teóricas deben combinarse con supuestos auxiliares para poder contrastarse empíricamente. En economía, se ha venido desarrollando un debate particularmente acalorado sobre la naturaleza y el papel de estos supuestos en las teorías económicas. Se examinarán el llamado "F(riedman)-Twist" ("the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions ", Friedman 1953), así como algunas críticas posteriores de autores como Musgrave, Lawson, Mäki y Cartwright, atendiendo al aparente conflicto entre el desideratum popperiano de buscar la contrastabilidad independiente de los supuestos auxiliares y los procedimientos de idealización necesarios para aislar las variables causales.

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