Controversies on the Empirical Significance of Auxiliary Assumptions

  1. Caamaño Alegre, María 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Valladolid
    info

    Universidad de Valladolid

    Valladolid, España

    ROR https://ror.org/01fvbaw18

Revista:
Philosophia: anuario de Filosofía

ISSN: 0328-9672,  2313-9528

Año de publicación: 2020

Volumen: 80

Número: 1

Páginas: 9-39

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Philosophia: anuario de Filosofía

Resumen

Theoretical laws need to be conjoined with auxiliary assumptions in order to be empirically testable, whether in natural or social science. A particularly heated debate has been developing over the nature and role of these assumptions in economic theories. The so called “F(riedman)-Twist” (“the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions”, Friedman 1953) as well as some later criticisms by authors like Musgrave, Lawson, Mäki and Cartwright will be examined. I will explore the apparent conflict between the Popperian desideratum to pursue the independent testability of auxiliary assumptions and the idealizational theoretical means needed to isolate causal variables.

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